require a visa from nationals of the other country, the effect on trade is larger, but less than double, at up to 25 per cent, while the effect on FDI is essentially the same as for unilateral restrictions. With such substantial negative effects, it is at least questionable whether many of the existing visa restrictions would pass a cost-benefit test.
Introduction
Visa restrictions impose a great burden on affected travelers. There is the cost and hassle of applying for the visa either via post, which can take weeks or months to be processed, or in person, which implies travelling to the embassy or one of the few consulates and waiting in the queue, possibly for hours. Employing professional visa services can mitigate the non-pecuniary cost, but only at the expense of a greater financial cost. Do visa restrictions also impose substantial costs on the country restricting access to its territory as well as on the country whose nationals face such restrictions?
This article tackles this question by analyzing the effect of visa restrictions on bilateral trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). It complements an existing analysis of the effect that visa restrictions have on dyadic flows of travel (Neumayer 2010 ). Yet, much of this travel will consist of tourists and without further analysis it is impossible to assess the economic damage that visa restrictions inflict on affected countries beyond the tourist sector.
Bilateral trade and FDI are likely to be negatively affected by visa restrictions.
Much of international trade requires personal contact with trading partners. Visa restrictions render such physical contact more difficult as they raise the burden for (potential) foreign trading partners to enter the country. The same will apply to foreign economic actors potentially investing in the country imposing the visa restriction. Almost by definition, the setting up of a direct investment abroad will not be possible without personal contact between the investment partners from the two countries.
One may of course argue that most trade and FDI will be sufficiently economically profitable to compensate potential trading and investing partners for the costs imposed by visa restrictions. However, this presupposes that the partners have perfect information about potential gains to be made from trade and investment. Yet, such potential gains will often only be discovered after personal contact or after having visited the site of potential investment several times. Hence, visa restrictions can damage a country's trade and FDI by rendering the discovery of mutually beneficial economic opportunities more costly. Furthermore, in some, particularly poorer, countries a considerable part of international trade takes place in markets concentrated close to the international border to neighboring countries. For such trade, even small additional costs such as the ones imposed by visa restrictions can defeat the small profit margins of traders.
There are therefore good reasons to presume that visa restrictions damage bilateral trade and investment. It is perhaps surprising that no empirical analysis has hitherto tried to estimate the size of these negative effects. One reason for this is the work effort involved in inputting data on visa restrictions for a global sample of nation-states. Fortunately, this paper's analysis can build on an existing dataset of visa restrictions, which the author has assembled previously (Neumayer 2006 ). This article finds that unilateral visa restrictions imposed by one country without reciprocal visa restrictions in the partner country reduce bilateral trade by up to 19 per cent, while such trade is estimated to be reduced by up to around 25 per cent if both countries have visa restrictions in place on travelers from the respective partner country. For bilateral FDI, the estimated effects are essentially the same for both unilateral and bilateral visa restrictions at up to around 25 per cent. Not surprisingly, the effects of visa restrictions on trade and investment are smaller than the estimated effect of such restrictions on travel by visitors as reported in Neumayer (2011) who finds that, depending on the exact model specification chosen, visa restrictions reduce such travel by on average between 52 and 63 per cent. Since not all trade and FDI is dependent on travelling into the partner countries and economic actors can in part substitute travel with other forms of communication and since much of foreign travel is not business-related, one would expect the effect of visa restrictions to be smaller on trade and FDI than on foreign travel as such.
For reasons explained in the next section, in which I describe the research design in detail, the estimated effects on trade and FDI are likely to be upward biased.
The reason is that the visa restrictions variable is likely to be correlated with some other factors that affect trade and FDI and which I am not able to include in the estimation model despite including a very large set of control variables. For example, visa restrictions may be in place because of bad relations between two countries or their governments, perhaps because of historical animosity or rivalry or a recent souring of relations in the wake of political developments in one or both of the two countries forming a dyad, not captured by any of the control variables. If so, the visa restrictions would be more a symptom of another causal factor -a bad bilateral relationship -hampering bilateral trade and FDI than a cause in itself. However, visa restrictions are too much prevalent (with only 17 per cent of dyads entirely free of visa restrictions) to simply represent the symptom of bad bilateral relationships. Given that visa restrictions are thus unlikely to merely be symptomatic of bad relationships and exert a significant and sizeable effect on trade and FDI even after controlling for a very wide range of factors that capture other aspects of dyadic relationships, the results tentatively suggest that policy makers need to seriously consider the economic costs visa restrictions impose on their economies. This latter type of visa typically does not represent any restriction at all since the procedure of getting it is extremely simple and does not involve any major check on the applicant. In fact, arguably its main purpose is to generate further revenue for the destination country rather than deterring foreign travellers from the countries facing such visa restrictions, even if the additional cost may of course deter some.
Research Design
Since visas that can be applied for at the border are very different from visas that need to be applied for in advance and before travelling, I will count only the latter as visa restrictions in the estimations.
citizen can enter 156 foreign countries only with a visa. Maps 1 and 2 demonstrate the geographical unevenness in the total number of visa restrictions a country imposes on foreign travellers and in the total number of restrictions its nationals face when travelling abroad. Clearly, while such aggregated information does not do justice to the complexity and variety of bilateral relationships between countries, the maps clearly demonstrate that access to foreign spaces is very unequal (Neumayer 2006 ).
The estimation of gravity-type models typically has to deal with two major problems: first, an identification problem due to potential omitted variable bias;
second, a potential sample selection problem due to the absence of information on other years, which is very time-consuming. The reason is that there will be little within-variation (variation over time) since practically all of the variation of the visa restriction variable will be dominated by between-variation (variation across dyads).
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Given dyad fixed effects are impossible, I try to reduce OVB as much as possible by including nation dummies for both partner countries, which control for the general trade and FDI openness of countries, and as many dyadic explanatory variables other than visa restrictions as possible. This cannot solve the identification problem, but it reduces it as much as possible.
As concerns the problem that for some dyads in the case of bilateral trade and for many dyads in the case of bilateral FDI no data are reported (Frankel 1997) , the most common practice seems to be recoding the missing values to zero or simply ignoring these observations and estimating the gravity model on dyads which report strictly positive trade or FDI values (Linders and Groot 2006) . Both measures are equivalent since the log of zero is undefined. However, doing this can lead to biased coefficient estimates due to sample selection. Bias is also likely to follow from substituting missing or zero values with an arbitrarily chosen small constant so that the natural log of these observations is defined (Linders and Groot 2006) .
There is no entirely satisfactory solution to this problem since the missing values could be because either trade or FDI is truly zero or because it is non-zero, but relatively small and escapes the statistical reporting or because it is non-reported for other reasons. Two major estimation models for dealing with the issue are the Tobit model (Tobin 1958 ) and Heckman's (1979) Heckman's sample-selection model works via estimating the determinants into being selected into the sample simultaneously with estimating the determinants of the levels of trade and FDI for the dyads selected into the sample. It is in principle quite a suitable model if there were a variable that has a strong effect on the likelihood of being selected, but no effect on the level stage (the so-called exclusion restriction).
The problem is that it is unclear what such a variable is supposed to be. In its absence, identification of the model depends on the non-linearity of one of the estimated parameters, namely the so-called inverse mills ratio, which some regard as more problematic (Verbeek 2000; Wooldridge 2002 ) than others (Leung and Yu 1996) .
Still, compared to the Tobit alternative, the Heckman model appears to provide the superior option. The main model is therefore estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS) on dyads that report positive trade and FDI values only, whereas a further model is estimated with Heckman's sample selection model to check the robustness of the findings from the main model. Table 1 are from the developing world should be stronger than in dyads in which at least one country is from the developed world, whose nationals can arguably more easily shoulder the extra burden of paying for, say, a visa services company to obtain the visa on their behalf. In an extension to the model reported in column 1 of table 1, in which I estimated separate visa restriction effects for developing country dyads on the one hand and dyads in which at least one partner is a developed country on the other, I
Results
find indeed that the effects are much stronger in the former set of dyads than in the others (detailed results not reported, but included in the replication dataset). This also tentatively suggests that visa restrictions do not merely pick up an underlying effect of good bilateral relationships not captured by some of the control variables since there is no reason why such an omitted variable effect would systematically differ between these two sets of country dyads.
Conclusion
This article has extended standard gravity-type models of trade and FDI (see, for Tentatively accepting the estimated effects, which are substantial but not absurdly high, visa restrictions do not only appear to impose a burden on affected travelers, they also impact the economies of countries that impose the restrictions and of countries whose nationals are faced with visa restrictions. Given the negative effects of visa restrictions, the question is why do countries impose visa restrictions at all? Neumayer (2006) argues that they are meant to reduce actual or perceived security concerns by preventing persona non grata from entering the country.
However, they are a very blunt instrument as they deter many others who would bring economic and other benefits to the country and will often not prevent the entrance of those who are meant to be kept out. For example, the 9/11 terrorists all entered the US on valid visas. I contend that many existing visa restrictions, particularly those in countries dependent on foreign visitors, trade and foreign investment, would not pass a cost-benefit test and more research is needed on why states maintain restrictions that prima facie would appear not to be in their own economic interest.
